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Abstract
In Europe, the need for additional funding coming from either budget cuts and/or
increased costs due to increased competition in university quality has reopened the
debate on the financing of university systems. An attractive alternative to the current
general-tax-financed subsidies are Income Contingent Loans (ICL), a flexible scheme
that puts more weight on private resources while enhancing progressivity. One challenge
of the viability of ICL systems is the functioning of the labor market for university
graduates. This paper offers a general analysis of the economics of ICL, followed by
an application to Spain. We set up a loan laboratory in which we can explore the
distributional effects of different loan systems to finance tertiary education at current
costs as well as to increase university funding to improve in its quality. We use simulated
lifetime earnings of graduates matching the dynamics of employment and earnings in the
Spanish administrative social security data to calculate the burden of introducing ICL
for individuals at different points of the earnings distribution and for the government.
We find that (1) our proposed structure is highly progressive under all specifications,
with the top quarter of the distribution paying close to the full amount of the tuition
and the bottom 10% paying almost no tuition; and (2) the share of total university
education subsidized by the government is between 16 and 56 percentage points less
than under the current system.
JEL Codes: I22, I23, I24
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1 Introduction
In Europe, the need for additional funding coming from either budget cuts and/or increased
university quality competition has reopened the debate on the financing of tertiary education.
To date, the prevailing system in the OECD relies on general-tax-financed subsidies to higher
education institutions. The main advantage of this system lies on its low costs for the
students, which end up bearing a small fraction of the total bill. When the main part of
university resources is publicly provided, however, government budget cuts have a strong
impact on the survival and quality of tertiary education institutions. This can have perverse
effects such as making university quality cyclical or exposing higher education institutions
to political uncertainty. In addition, tuition fees are flat across the income distribution
of students and the subsidy to institutions is financed with taxes from both college and
non-college educated families, making the system regressive. Attractive alternatives that
circumvent the main issues of the current systems are graduate taxes or income contingent
loans (see Diris and Ooghe (2018)). In this paper, we focus on Income Contingent Loans,
which offers flexibility in different dimensions and puts more weight on private resources
while enhancing progressivity with respect to the prevailing system. This paper offers a
general analysis of the economics of ICL, followed by an application to Spain.
In a nutshell, an ICL can be characterized as follows. University students obtain a loan
from the government to pay their fees (this could also cover maintenance costs). Repayments
start upon graduation and depend on ex-post labor income and are paid at zero or low interest
rates. There is a minimum exemption income level below which graduates do not need to
pay. Repayments are made for a certain number of years up to a maximum established.
It is worth noticing that these loans are very different to traditional students loans, which
in general have no insurance aspect, payments are not dependent on actual income after
graduation and market determined interest rates. To ease the introduction of this scheme, a
natural starting point for the government would be to consider a zero interest rate, which is
the baseline policy in our analysis. In this sense, a more appropriate name for this scheme
is Returnable Fellowships.
We first offer a simple theoretical framework to understand how the general-tax-financed
subsidies and the ICLs systems work, as well as their comparison from the government, the
tax payers and the universities’ points of view. This will allow us to understand govern-
ment spending, subsidies in both systems and tax burdens in both systems. This simple
framework allows to comprehend, among other things, why a general-tax-financed subsidies
system is highly regressive, while terminating free universities would make the system more
progressive. It would also become clear that moving from a general-tax-financed subsidies
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system to an ICL system would free public resources. We discuss the case in which these
resources could be used for other public spending as well as the case that these could be
used to increase university quality.
One challenge of the viability of ICL systems is the functioning of the labor market
for university graduates. To the extent that the labor market features high unemployment
rates for the youth and/or high incidence of temporary employment with low and unstable
incomes, as in several European countries, a switch from a general-tax-financed subsidies
system to an ICL system is non-obvious. In these dysfunctional labor markets, the high
volatility that characterizes flows in and out of temporary employment poses a challenge to
expected future income and repayments. In this respect, our application to the Spanish case
is particularly interesting, given that the labor market shares a wide set of features with
other European countries but it is more extreme.
The university system in Spain has struggled to keep up with the the increasing com-
petition from a more globalized labor and education market. The European University
Association defines the Spanish university system as declining and under pressure, due to a
16% decrease in public funding and an increase of 26% in enrolled students during the period
2008-2016. According to Education at a Glance (OECD (2016)), Spain is at the tail in edu-
cation spending compared to other OECD countries. Moreover, the percentage allocated to
scholarships and student aid is quite small, below 5% overall and 2% for tertiary education.
In contrast to Spain, the United Kingdom (UK) has been working on increasing university
resources through a series of reforms implemented during the last two decades. Among
other countries in Europe, the UK was one of the precursors in designing a progressive loan
system subsidized by the government to finance higher education. The UK has undergone
three main reforms during the last 20 years1 that included increasing fees and designing
an income-contingent-loan system. While it is still relatively early to evaluate the long-run
effects, the evidence so far reveals that the system has been working reasonably well in the
UK, especially in its progressive nature (Dearden et al., 2008; Azmat and Simion, 2017). Our
reference application is to study how a loan system similar to that in the UK 2007 reform
would work to finance higher education in Spain and study the distributional implications
for lifetime income, the burden of repayments on workers, and the cost to the government.
A common feature of countries with the prevailing financing system is the lack of credit
markets for university loans. Beyond the extensive participation margin, which is outside the
scope of this paper,2 the availability of borrowing against future human capital can determine
1In 1998, 2007 and 2012.
2Azmat and Simion (2017) show that in the UK the increase in university fees together with the intro-
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the earnings distribution of the skilled workers by improving the allocation of talent. An
example relevant to a case like Spain would be geographical mobility.
Indeed, the main objective of this study is to set up a loans laboratory to explore different
loan policies and the effects along the income distribution. As mentioned above, one challenge
of this exercise will be adding the specifics of the dysfunctional labor market in Spain. In
this sense, unlike previous literature, a contribution of this paper is to model permanent and
temporary contracts separately.
There is a substantive literature on university funding (see for instance García-Peñalosa
and Walde (2000), Diris and Ooghe (2018) and references within) and also several studies
have looked into university financing in Spain.3 Of those, very few have analyzed alternative
arrangements to the general-tax-financed status quo. The analysis of the impact of education
loans in Spain has been limited to one paper, which focuses on the specific case of loans-to-
masters that was implemented in 2007 and lasted only until 2011 (see Collado Muñoz et al.
(2017)).4
A fundamental element in our loan laboratory are the dynamics of earnings over life.
In our analysis, we use simulated lifetime earnings of graduates matching the dynamics of
employment and earnings, as well as the earnings cross-sectional distribution, in the Span-
ish administrative social security data (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales y el Módulo
Fiscal). Employment transition probabilities are modeled using probit regressions on a set
of covariates, including past income and contract duration.
Our framework can replicate the dynamics of employment and earnings in Spain. We
use the simulated profiles to calculate the burden of introducing public loans for individu-
als at different points of the earnings distribution and for the government under different
combinations of the aforementioned parameters. We find that (1) our proposed structure is
highly progressive under all specifications, with the top quarter of the distribution paying
close to the full amount of the tuition and the bottom 10% paying almost no tuition; and
(2) the share of total university education subsidized by the government is between 16 and
56 percentage points less than under the current system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we offer a theoretical frame-
duction of ICL did not affect the participation margin.
3See, among others, de la Fuente and Jimeno (2011); Beneito et al. (2016); Mora et al. (2002); Escardibul
and Perez-Esparrells (2014).
4The loans-to-masters program did not prove to be very successful, partly due to the lack of consistency
of the conditions (interest rate, repayment horizon, and the like) across years. There was also a grace period
stipulated independently of the income level and a monthly fixed repayment, which imposed a heavy burden
to graduates at the lower end of the income distribution.
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work for thinking about the economics of ICLs. In the rest of the paper we analyze the
distributional implications of introducing ICLs to Spain. We discuss the simulation of the
life-cycle earnings of graduates in Section 3 and then analyze different settings of ICLs in
the loan laboratory in Section 4. In Section 5 we offer a discussion of our findings in terms
of policy and conclude.
2 The Burden of University Financing: A Theoretical
Framework
In this section, we propose a simple theoretical framework to understand the impact of ICLs
on public and universities finances, as well as the implied cost for families. We begin by
laying out a generic framework in which the government, universities, and individuals interact
with each other. We then use that framework to compare the burden of different higher-
education financing schemes, starting with the prevailing general-tax-financed subsidies, the
intermediate case of a a graduate income tax, and finally the ICLs in more detail.
In addition to the share of the cost born by public and private agents, we will compare
the different systems along two dimensions: (1) between-group progressivity, or the extent to
which these shift the cost of higher education to skilled and away from unskilled workers;
and (2) within-group progressivity, referring to redistribution across the income distribution
of future university graduates.
Three types of agents compose our economy: the government, the public university
sector, and workers.5 Figure 1 summarizes the main features of this section and makes the
link between agents explicit. While the earnings dynamics of the workers play a central role,
the policy will be evaluated in terms of present values.
Workers
There are two kinds of workers: skilled (s) and unskilled (u), with a mass of N s and Nu,
respectively. Skilled workers are those who have finished college. All individuals live for
T + 1 periods: period t = 0 is mapped into the 4 years of schooling for the skilled agents.
Resources. Within each group, workers are heterogeneous in their earnings. These earnings
are exogenous and evolve in a stochastic fashion. Let yjit denote the individual earnings of a
worker i of type j (j = s, u) in period t. The specific dynamics of earnings will be discussed
in detail in the next section. For this section, it suffices to assume that the average skilled
5We abstract from unemployed individuals for the moment since the relevant burden measures are not
affected by their presence. In the empirical section, workers will be allowed to become unemployed.
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earnings are higher than the average unskilled earnings at all times. Unskilled workers begin
receiving earnings in period 0, while skilled workers have to wait until period 1 to receive
wages. Depending on the specific financing scheme, skilled workers can receive transfers from
the government during the schooling years, denoted by gEH , in the form of grants or loans
to cover fees and maintenance. We assume these transfers are the same for all university
graduates. Similarly, unskilled workers can receive transfers g−E from the pool of public
resources that are not devoted to financing higher education.
Expenses. All workers pay income taxes. We assume workers in the same group face the
same proportional income tax and that τ s > τu, which captures the progressive nature of
the tax code in a simplified manner. In addition, skilled workers’ expenses include college
fees f whenever they are in college and loan repayments whenever applicable. Workers
eat everything left after covering fees, loan, and tax payments. We denote this residual
consumption of the numeraire good as ci.
Government
Resources. The only public resources are the income taxes paid by the workers, as described
in subsection 2. The total resources of the government are therefore given by
T = τ sY s + τuY u, (1)
where Y j =
∑T
t=1 Y
j
t and Y
j
t =
´
i∈S y
j
it, for j = s, u, where S is the set of skilled workers.
That is, Y j denotes aggregate lifetime earnings of workers of type j.
Expenses. Let G denote total public spending. We decompose G into two components:
G = GE +G−E, (2)
where GE denotes public spending devoted to financing public higher education and G−E
all other public spending. It will be useful to further decompose the amount of government
spending in education GE into payments directly made to institutions GEI and transfers to
households GEH = N sgEH .
We assume the government runs a balanced budget:
T = G−E +GEI +G
E
H . (3)
Using equations (2) and (3), and given our assumption that income taxes are proportional
5
to earnings, we can also decompose the resources T into those that are used for higher
education and those that are not as follows:
T = (τ se + τ
s
−e)Y
s + (τue + τ
u
−e)Y
u, (4)
where τ je and τ
j
−e (j = s, u) are artificial taxes that will depend on the actual income tax
rate and the specific higher education financing scheme. This accounting distinction will be
useful to define the burden of public financing on individuals.
University Sector
Resources. Public universities get funding from the government (GEI ) as well as out of pocket
fees paid for by the individuals directly F = N sf .
Expenses. Universities need a minimum payment of C in the form of running costs. C can
be thought of as including current professor salaries, maintenance, and the like. In addition,
universities could shift extra resources to improve quality. Let I(Q) denote the investment
in university quality. We assume there is a basic level of quality Q achieved by simply
running the university and paying C. That is, I(Q) = 0. As a result, I(Q) is the amount
of university resources, in addition to the maintenance costs, that achieves a level of quality
equal to Q > Q. Higher quality will result in skilled earnings that are A(Q) times higher.
The university budget constraint is therefore given by
GEI + F = C + I(Q) (5)
Using this theoretical framework, we next proceed to introduce the specifics of different
higher-education financing systems. For illustration, we will make the following the assump-
tions when comparing the different systems: (1) We keep quality at its base level so that
I(Q) = 0, which can be understood as Q being the current level of value added of university
education. (2) The total cost of universities is fixed at C¯. (3) Total public spending is fixed
at G¯ and the budget of the government is balanced, so the resources T¯ are fixed as well. (4)
We take the earnings streams {ysia}i∈S,a=1,...,T and {yuia}i∈U,a=1,...,T as given. Assumptions (3)
and (4) also impose fixed total income taxes τ¯u and τ¯ s. These assumptions mean we will be
evaluating the impact of revenue neutral policy changes in terms of burden shifts between
agents.
More specifically, the different financing systems are going to be compared in terms of
6
Government
T s + T u = G−E +GEI +G
E
H
T s - Total taxes paid by S
T u - Total taxes paid by U
G−E - Public expenditure not on education
GEI - Public exp on educ transferred to universities
GEH - Public exp on educ transferred to individuals
Universities
F +GEI = C + I(Q)
F - tuition and fees
C - running costs
I(Q) - investment in qual-
ity
Workers U (individual budget cons.)∑T
t=0(1− τu)Y uit = c
Y u - exogenous earnings
τu - income tax rate for U
Workers S (individual budget cons.)
gEH+
∑T
t=1(1−τ s)A(Q)Y sit = f+c
Y s - exogenous earnings
A(Q) - quality premium
τ s - income tax rate for S
GEH
T s =
´ Ns
0
τ sA(Q)Y si
T u =
´ Nu
0
τuY ui
GEI
F =
´ Ns
0
f
Q
C
Y s
Y u
G−E
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework Summary
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how they shift the total cost of higher education C¯ between the public and private sector,
how much of the public burden is paid by non-university graduates, and the degree of re-
distribution within university graduates. Table 1 summarizes the key dimensions for such
comparison that we analyze in detail in the next subsections. Whenever comparing sys-
tems, to clearly differentiate the different variables corresponding to each scheme, we define
F (system), τ je (system), and τ
j
−e(system) as the level of fees, taxes to finance education, and
remaining taxes, under each system GTF, GT, ICL.
2.1 General-tax-financed subsidies
We begin by discussing the system that is currently in place, in which university resources
come predominantly from direct subsidies from the government, covering around 80% of the
total cost of universities. The remaining 20% is paid for by the users at the time of paying
tuition. This is the prevalent system in Europe.6 The public subsidies are financed similarly
to any public service using general taxes, hence its name. While the government offers some
grants and fellowships to students, they are very small and the big part of the subsidy comes
from the direct transfers to institutions. For illustrative purposes, we will assume public
transfers to individuals for the purpose of paying for higher education are zero. Using the
general framework developed above, that means GEH = 0 and GE = GEI .
Therefore, the total cost of higher education C¯ is split between the government and the
university-graduates: C¯ = GE + F . Given a level of fees F , GE = C¯ − F ≥ 0 is financed
with general education resources τ seY s + τue Y u. In other words, everybody, independently
of whether they attended university or not, contributes to university resources through the
general income tax. In addition to their share of income taxes, skilled workers pay the full
amount of fees for attending university, which is the same for all university-graduates.
2.2 Graduate Tax
Before moving on to our proposed ICL policy, it is worth discussing the case of the graduate
tax. This type of system is used by some public universities in Uruguay. A graduate tax
consists of shifting the total cost of higher education entirely to those that benefit from it
through deferred payments in the form of a tax upon graduation and until retirement.
In that sense, the total cost of higher education C¯ is financed entirely by the university-
graduates through an income tax (in addition to the regular income tax) φ, without upfront
or tuition payments. We can think of this as the government paying for the cost C¯ initially
6Countries such as England and The Netherlands have transitioned to an ICL scheme, but the majority
of the European countries still maintain this system.
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Table 1: Comparison of the Three Systems: Summary
GTF
Fees (upfront) F (GTF ) (given)
GE C¯ − F (GTF ) > 0
Public Savings 0
Financing C¯ Gen.-Tax + Out of Pocket
Burdenue τ
u
e (GTF )Y
u + 0
Burdense τ
s
e (GTF )Y
s + F (GTF )
Within-Group Prog. Gen.-Tax + Out of Pocket
Burdense,p10
GE
G¯
τ¯ s = τ se (GTF )Y
u + F (GTF )
Burdense,p90 τ
s
e (GTF )Y
s + F (GTF )
Ratio
τse (GTF )Y
s
p90+F (GTF )
τse (GTF )Y
s
p10+F (GTF )
GT
Fees (upfront) F (GT ) = 0
GE C¯ − Φ = 0
Public Savings Φ− F (GTF ) = C¯ − F (GTF )
Financing C¯ Gen.-Tax (GE) + Out of Pocket
Burdenue 0 + 0
Burdense 0 + φY
s
Within-Group Prog. Gen.-Tax (GE) + Out of Pocket
Burdensp10 0 + φY
s
p10
Burdensp90 0 + φY
s
p90
Ratio
Y sp90
Y sp10
ICL
Fees (upfront) F (ICL) = C¯
GE C¯ − ´
i∈S
∑a¯i
a Pia > 0
Public Savings
´
i∈S
∑a¯i
a Pia − F (GTF )
Financing C¯ Gen.-Tax (GE) + Out of Pocket
Burdenue τ
u
e (ICL)Y
u + 0
Burdense τ
s
e (ICL)Y
s +
´
i∈S
∑a¯i
a Pia
Within-Group Prog. Gen.-Tax (GE) + Out of Pocket
Burdensp10
GE(ICL)
G¯
τ¯ s = τ se (ICL)Y
u
p10 +
´
i∈p10
∑a¯i
a Pia = 
Burdensp90 τ
s
e (ICL)Y
s
p90 +
´
i∈p90
∑a¯i
a Pia ≈ C¯
Ratio
τse (ICL)Y
u
p90+C¯
τse (ICL)Y
u
p10+
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and then recovering the full amount in the future, so that, in present value GE = C¯−Φ = 0,
where Φ = φY s denotes the total revenue from the graduate-tax. A consequence of GE = 0
is that income taxes of the unskilled workers are never used to subsidy higher education, or
τue = 0. In addition to their share of income taxes τ¯ s, skilled workers pay the graduate tax,
adding up to a total burden for university graduates of (τ¯ s + φ)Y s. Notice that this amount
is again the same for all university-graduates. Given that we are assuming fixed C¯, it has to
be the case that:
C¯ = Φ = φY s = F (GTF ) + τ se (GTF )Y
s + τue (GTF )Y
u
φ =
F (GTF ) + τ se (GTF )Y
s + τue (GTF )Y
u
Y s
(6)
2.3 Income Contingent Loans
We propose an income contingent loan (ICL) system. ICLs have become a popular alternative
to general-tax-financed (GTF) subsidies among developed countries.7 This system is in spirit
similar to the Graduate-Tax, but its structure is more complex and flexible, allowing for
varying degrees of cost shifting, as will become clear in the subsequent discussion. The
key feature of ICLs is the combination of private contributions, in the form of repayments
contingent to future income; and government subsidies, given directly to the individuals in
the form of debt write-off and repayment exemptions.
For the purpose of this description, we will focus on the extreme case where the fees
cover the total cost of education in present terms, which makes it comparable to the GT
case discussed above: F = C¯ = Φ. This implies that GEI = 0 and GE = GEH = F = C¯. We
will briefly comment on intermediate cases in the discussion below. We begin by introducing
the elements that characterize the loans and repayments and then proceed to discuss the
implied burdens.
A Rich Set of Instruments
An attractive feature of ICLs is the flexibility in its design compared to other progressive
financing alternatives, such as a graduate tax. A rich number of instruments are combined
to achieve varying degrees of public savings and progressivity:
d− Principal: total tuition fees over all years + maintenance (maybe)
7In Europe, Hungary, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom adopted ICLs in the last decade, see
(Diris and Ooghe, 2018). Outside Europe, Australia and New Zealand have been pioneers of this scheme.
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p− Repayment rate: fraction of gross earnings that is used for repayment
x− Exemption level above which workers start repaying debt
m− Write-off year after which the debt is canceled
r− Interest rate of debt
University students obtain a loan d from the government during schooling years to pay
their fees and, possibly, room and board. Repayments start upon graduation and are a
fraction p of ex-post labor income and are paid at low interest rates (r). There is a minimum
exemption income level x below which graduates do not need to pay. Repayments are made
for a certain number of years up to a maximum established (m). Because of the nature
of this repayment scheme, it will be useful to adopt a life-cycle perspective and think of a
period as an age year, denoted by a. In the remaining of this section, we discuss the main
elements of debt repayment in detail.
Income-Contingent Repayment. Repayment is contingent on income and the first x
euros are exempt for everyone. That means that those who earn less than x do not repay
in a given year, and the rest pay a fraction of their income above x. We define non-exempt
earnings for individual i at age a as:
Y NEi,a = max {Yi,a − x, 0}
Let a¯i be the full-repayment age of individual i. Annual payments for individual i at age
a are therefore calculated as
Pi,a =

pY NEi,a if a < a¯i
min
{
(1 + r)Di,a−1, pY NEi,a
}
if a = a¯i
0 if a > a¯i
(7)
where Di,a−1 is the outstanding debt of individual i at the beginning of age a and,
therefore, predetermined in period a − 1. Equation (7) states that repayment is fixed and
proportional to the non-exempt amount of earnings, resembling a graduate tax. Notice that
the only dependence of payments on the outstanding debt Di,a appears in the last period of
debt repayment and simply to indicate that, should the fixed payment of pY NE exceed the
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remaining debt plus interests, then only the remaining debt has to be paid.
Full-repayment age. Graduates pay for a maximum of m years unless they have been
able to pay their complete debt before in which case their full-repayment age is when their
last payment pays is able to cover their outstanding debt
a¯i = min
{
m, a˜ s.t.
a˜∑
a=1
Pi,a ≥ Di,a˜
}
(8)
Debt. Starting from Di,0 = d, outstanding debt is calculated at the end of each period
as Di,a = (1 + r)Di,a−1 − Pi,a until the repayment age. A full description of the repayment
structure and explicit formulas for Di,a and a¯i can be found in Figure 2 and equation (8)
below.
Therefore, the total cost of higher education C¯ is split between the government and the
university-graduates: C¯ = GE +
´
i∈S
∑a¯i
t=1 Pit. A useful way to think about public financing
in this system is to assume university-graduates pay the full amount of fees and can obtain
a loan for the same amount immediately. As a result, the fees cancel in the government
budget and GE covers the part of the fees that university-graduates are not able to repay:
GE = C¯−F+F−´
i∈S
∑a¯i
t=1 Pit > 0. In addition to their share of income taxes, skilled workers
pay a share of the loan given by their income history, which is different for each university-
graduate, adding up to a total burden for university graduates of τ¯ sY s+
´
i∈S
∑a¯i
t=1 Pit. Notice
that, similarly to GTF, and in contrast to GT, GE ≥ 0 is financed with general education
resources τ seY s + τue Y u. We will discuss in the next subsection how τue (GTF ) and τue (ICL)
compare, as well as the conditions under which ICLs imply a public savings compared to
GTF and the advantages over GT.
2.4 Comparing the Three Systems
Next, we will use all the information in subsections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 to summarize the
distributional implications of each system in two results. For the sake of clarity, we relegate
the calculations and details to Appendix A.
Result 1: Between-group progressivity (the ratio of the burden for non-university- and
university-graduates) is highest (lowest) under the GT system and, provided a mini-
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Table 2: ICL Repayment Scheme
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mum level of debt repayment under ICL, lowest (highest) under GTF.
We focus on the total burden of each system for the workers, defined as Burdenj
(j = u, s), that measures the cost of financing the public sector G¯, including the fi-
nancing of the university sector GE, the non-university-sector G−E, plus possible out
of pocket spending on the payment of fees. At this point, it is necessary to make an
assumption about the use of the resources shifted out of the public sector when moving
away from the GTF system. One option is to think of it as investment in other public
services, such as primary public education, which could benefit both types of workers.
For simplicity and without affecting our main results, we will assume that the extra
amount of G−E will entirely be used as transfers to low-income families. For compar-
ison, we take fees in the GTF as given by the status quo and write the formulas as a
function of these, as well as of previously defined fixed policy parameters.
We first define PublicSavings is defined for each system with respect to the current
GTF system:
PublicSavings(GTF ) = 0 (9)
PublicSavings(GT ) = Φ− F (GTF ) = C¯ − F (GTF ) (10)
PublicSavings(ICL) =
ˆ
i∈S
a¯i∑
a=1
Pia − F (GTF ). (11)
We can now concisely define the ratio that characterizes between-group progressivity:
Burdenu(system)
Burdens(system)
=
τ¯uY u − PublicSavings(system)
τ¯ sY s + F (GTF ) + PublicSavings(system)
(12)
Assuming the repayment share in the ICL case is sufficiently large so that Result 1
holds, it is easy to see that
PublicSavings(GT ) ≥ PublicSavings(ICL) > PublicSavings(GTF ) (13)
with equality if there is full repayment, which concludes our discussion of Result 2.
Result 2: Within-group progressivity (redistribution between university graduates) is zero
under GTF and GT, beyond the progressivity of the income tax code.
Let Burdensprc denote the corresponding burden for a subgroup of skilled workers in the
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percentile prc of the earnings distribution. We will define within-group progressivitiy
as the ratio of the burden for those university-graduates on the top 10% of the income
distribution (group p90) and the burden for those university-graduates on the bottom
10% of the income distribution (group p10) , as follows:
Burdensp90(GTF )
Burdensp10(GTF )
=
τ¯ sY sp90 + F (GTF )
τ¯ sY sp10 + F (GTF )
(14)
Burdensp90(GT )
Burdensp10(GT )
=
τ¯ sY sp90 + Φ
τ¯ sY sp10 + Φ
=
(τ¯ s + φ)Y sp90
(τ¯ s + φ)Y sp10
=
Y sp90
Y sp10
(15)
Burdensp90(ICL)
Burdensp10(ICL)
=
τ¯ sY sp90 +
´
i∈p90
∑a¯i
a Pia
τ¯ sY sp10 +
´
i∈p10
∑a¯i
a Pia
≈ τ¯
sY sp90 + C¯
τ¯ sY sp10 + 
, (16)
where Y sprc ≡
´
i∈p10 Yi, for prc = p10, p90, and  is used to denote a small amount,
always smaller than F (GTF ). The last relation in equation (16) follows from our
empirical results in the next section for all reasonable parameter combinations.
It is very easy to see in equations (14) and (15) that there is no redistribution from top
to bottom earners under the GTF and GT systems, beyond the intrinsic differences in
income and income taxes. Looking at the same part of equation (16) for ICL, however,
the top earners end up paying nearly the full amount of the cost of universities while
the bottom earners pay even less than in the GTF case.
We conclude this section by discussing both the importance of the combination of the
between-group and within-group progressivities in each system. To make our point, we take
the extreme case of the US higher education system, where fees cover the total cost and
commercial banks offer classic loans. As mentioned in the introduction, these traditional
loans are very different to income contingent loans as repayments are not a function of
future income nor they allow for write-offs or exemptions. Moreover, these traditional loans
are repaid at the market rate. In this sense, as mentioned before, our proposed system
resembles more a scheme of Returnable Fellowships, provided a zero interest rate, which is
our baseline scenario. This system does feature total between-group progressivity, similarly
to the GT, but they do not have any progressivity component within the university graduates.
Actually, within-progressivity tends to be negative because higher earning graduates repay
their loan faster and thus paying less in terms of accumulated interests than the lower
earning graduates, who end up accumulating large amounts of debt over time. This example
highlights the importance of considering both kinds of redistributions and, while this case
is more extreme, is reminiscent of the case of the GT, where the within-group component is
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not negative but it is close to zero. In this sense, the ICL offers a balanced combination of
both between and within progressivity through a rich set of instruments.
In the rest of the paper we analyze the distributional implications of introducing ICLs to
Spain. In other words, the degree of within-progressivity of different specifications of ICLs.
In order to do so, we first need to simulate the life-cycle earnings of graduates using a model
of earnings dynamics and employment transitions. We do so in the next section.
3 Simulating Life-Cycle Earnings Dynamics
While many of the elements of our ICL design are policy instruments that will be analyzed
within the context of our application, there is one element that needs empirical discipline:
the life-cycle dynamics of earnings. We simulate these using a estimated model that combines
employment transitions and earnings dynamics.
3.1 The Data: Social Security and Tax Records
We use administrative data from the Continuous Sample of Working Histories (MCVL here-
after, for its acronym in Spanish) on earnings and working histories of Spanish workers. The
data is provided by the Spanish Social Security Administration in cooperation with the IRS
counterpart in Spain. In this section we give an overview of the data source and a description
of our sample. For the database specifics and more details we refer to Section 2 in Bonhomme
and Hospido (2013).
The MCVL consists of a 4% representative random sample of all workers affiliated with
the social security administration within a given year between 2004 and 2015. We use data
starting in 2005, when the sample has a panel design: all individuals present in each wave
subsequently remain in the sample. Retroactive information on the whole working history is
provided as early as 1962 for work variables and 1980 for earnings. Bonhomme and Hospido
(2013) show that the sample is representative at least since the late 1980s. The information
from the Social Security records can be obtained at a daily frequency, but earnings are often
top-coded at a preset industry-specific threshold. We complement the earnings data with
an IRS supplement matched to the Social Security records. The tax supplement contains
non-top-coded information on annual earnings. Our baseline frequency will therefore be
annual.
Sample Selection
We select college graduates that are at least 22 and at most 60 years old.
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Main Variables
Earnings. The earnings data are extracted from the “Annual summary of retentions and
payments for the personal income tax on earnings, economic activities, awards, and income
imputations” (known as Modelo 190 ). All employers are required to fill out Modelo 190 with
the total compensation paid to each of their employees during the year, independently of
whether or not they pay labor income taxes. To obtain a measure of total annual labor
earnings, we add all the incomes that correspond to each worker during the reference year.
All amounts are deflated to 2011 euros. We exclude self-employment income.
Annual Employment Status. Given that our period of observation is one year, it
is not uncommon to find workers that hold different simultaneous jobs or that change jobs
within the same year. In some cases, some of those contracts are temporary and some
permanent. This poses a challenge when defining employment spells at the annual level.
We define employment status in terms of share of annual time spent in each kind of job:
permanent, temporary, or none. Workers who have zero annual earnings or earn less that
the corresponding amount to a month minimum-wage salary are considered unemployed.
Lifetime Earnings Quantiles. Using our longitudinal data we calculate lifetime earn-
ings for every individual assuming no discount rate. This in turn determines in which quantile
of the lifetime earnings distribution every individual is. We group individuals according to
this variable to understand progressivity in our loan laboratory.
3.2 Employment Transitions
We adapt the framework of Dearden et al. (2008) for the Spanish labor market. A key
contribution of this paper is to allow for differentiated levels of labor market attachments to
capture realistic job transitions in two-tier markets, as it is the case in Spain.
At each point in time, a worker can be in one of three statuses: unemployed (U), employed
in a permanent contract (P ), and employed in a temporary contract (T ). Let Π be the
transition matrix that determines the probabilities of entering status st from status st−1.
PtTt
Ut
 =
piPPt piPTt piPUtpiTPt piTTt piTUt
piUPt pi
UT
t pi
UU
t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Πt
Pt−1Tt−1
Ut−1
 , (17)
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where
pijkt ≡ Pr (st = k | st−1 = j) for i, j = P, T, U
We estimate these transitions with probit regressions by regressing a dummy variable that
takes 1 in the case of a transition on a constant, a quartic in age, and additional covariates
depending on the type of the transition. In particular,
pist−1,st =

Φ
(
βy1yt−1 + β
y
2y
2
t−1
)
if (st−1, st) ∈ {(P, T ), (P,U), (T, U)}
Φ
(
βd1dur1t−1 + β
d
2dur2t−1
)
if (st−1, st) ∈ {(U, P ), (U, T )}
Φ
(
βy1yt−1 + β
y
2y
2
t−1 + β
d
1dur1t−1 + β
d
2dur2t−1
)
if (st−1, st) ∈ {(T, P )}
,
(18)
where
dur1t ≡ I {st = j | st−1 = k and j 6= k} for i, j = P, T, U
dur2t ≡ I {st = j | st−1 = k and j = k} for i, j = P, T, U
yt ≡ log earnings in t
Φ ≡ Normal distribution cdf
denotes whether the worker had spent one of more years in the initial state. For example,
in the case of a transition from unemployed to permanent (st−1, st) = (U, P ), dur1t−1 = 1 if
the worker was unemployed only for one period last year, and dur2 = 1 if the worker had
been unemployed for two or more periods last year. All specifications include a constant and
a quartic in age in the set of regressors, that we have omitted for the sake of exposition.
At the beginning of an employment spell within a contract, each worker draws a level of
earnings determined by its previous status and age. This type of transition earnings will be
explained in detailed below.
3.3 Earnings Dynamics
Transition Earnings
Whenever the worker changes status, we estimate the new initial earnings as a function of
age, duration of previous spell, and past earnings.
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More specifically, let
yss
′
t ≡ y (st = s′|st−1 = s)
denote log earnings at t of a worker who just moved from status s to s′.
We pose the following specification for the log of earnings in the first year at the new
status:
log Y ss
′
t = β1dur1
s
t−1 + β2dur2
s
t−1 + β2y
L
t−1 + ξt,
where yLt−1 denotes the level of earnings in the previous status s if s ∈ {P, T}, the last
earnings observed if s = U and the worker has been unemployed for only 1 year, or a dummy
that equals 1 indicating that the last level of earnings is missing in the case of s = U and
the worker has spent 2 or more years unemployed. dur1 and dur2 are as above. A constant
and a quartic in age are also included in the set of regressors.
Continuation Earnings
If the worker remains in the same job status, earnings follow a flexible age-dependent au-
toregressive process. The basic statistical framework follows Karahan and Ozkan (2013) and
emphasizes the age dynamics of persistence and volatility of earnings. In particular, we
borrow the specifics and estimates from our companion paper Cabrales et al. (2018), where
we show the importance of allowing the type of contract – temporary or permanent – to
influence uncertainty, and earnings dynamics in general, in the case of a fragmented labor
market like the Spanish one.
In a nutshell, continuation earnings follow an ARMA(1,1) stochastic process with fixed
effects and profile heterogeneity. To capture the evolution of uncertainty over life, the per-
sistence of the AR(1) component and the variance of both idiosyncratic shocks are functions
of age and contract. We introduce contract-specific uncertainty by separately estimating
the process for a sample of workers that have spent most of their life linking temporary
contracts. The idea is to capture that continuation within temporary contracts entails more
uncertain earnings than continuation within permanent contracts. The parameters are esti-
mated by minimizing the distance between the empirical and the model-implied covariance
matrix using Generalized Method of Moments with efficient weighting matrix.
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Simulation Fit
We combine the employment transitions and earnings dynamics estimates to simulate the
earnings of 20,000 individuals between the ages of 22 and 60. Figure 2 compares the data
(solid) and the simulated (dashed) cross-sectional distribution of earnings at each age. More
specifically, Figure 2 plots different percentiles of the earnings distribution, for a given age,
and therefore characterizes the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of earnings for
the purpose of comparing the fit to the data. Overall, our statistical model does a good job
matching the distribution of earnings at all ages.
Figure 2: Quantiles of Log earnings: Data (solid) vs. Simulation (dashed)
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
11
11.5
12
L
o
g
E
a
rn
in
g
s
5
10
25
50
75
90
95
4 Loans Laboratory
We next use the panel of simulated lifetime income profiles
{{Yi,a}60a=22}Ni=1 to study the
implications of introducing a menu of public income-contingent loans in Spain. Remember
the basics of our model: fees can be deferred until starting to work, repayments will depend
on ex-post labor income and minimum exemption, and there will be a debt write-off and low
interest rates.
We start describing the current general-tax-financed subsidies in Spain in the next subsec-
tion. Then, in subsection 4.2, we consider several policy experiments modifying the different
parameters of the ICLs. Finally, in subsection 4.3, we consider the effects of using the
potential additional resources generated by ICLs to increase university quality.
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4.1 Current Subsidies in Spain
The current university financing system in Spain is basically characterized mostly by subsi-
dies to universities coming from general income taxes.The following are the key figures of the
current costs and subsidies in Spain (see de la Fuente and Boscá (2014)). For 2010, average
total expenditure by the government across different universities and programs in Spain is
around 8, 900 million euros. That year, households spent around 2,600 million euros in higher
education. This means that the share of public resources in public education in Spain, or
the subsidy defined in equation (24) below, is around 80%. We will use this benchmark in
our policy experiments in the next subsection.
4.2 Policy Experiments
For each of the parameters defined in Section 2.3, we evaluate different sets of values that
can be thought of as reflecting different fiscal scenarios and/or political preferences. For
every policy experiment, we will show the following outcomes:
• Burden of the cost of education: As explained in our theoretical framework, the burden
of the cost of education is the sum of taxes paid that finance education as well as the
repayment of loans in the case of ICLs; or the fees in the case of GTF (see equations (14)
and (16), respectively). In terms of the within-group progressivity that each financing
system generates, the key lies in the repayments and fees rather than the taxes. We
therefore consider two measures of the burden, with and without the taxes. In this
quantitative section of the paper, we introduce time discounting denoted as β. The
corresponding individual burden in each system, that is, net present discounted value
of all repayments: is:
NPVi(ICL) =
a¯∑
a=1
βaPi,a (19)
NPV totali (ICL) =
a¯∑
a=1
βaPi,a +
T∑
a=1
βa τ se (ICL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
GE
G¯
τ¯s
yi,a (20)
NPVi(GTF ) = f (21)
NPV totali (GTF ) = f +
T∑
a=1
βa τ se (GTF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
GE
G¯
τ¯s
yi,a, (22)
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• Public subsidy, as defined by share of higher-education financed with public resources.
We find the share more appropriate for the empirical section than the GE that we used
in Section 2 given that the total aggregate amounts will be sensitive to the specifics of
the simulation.
Sub(ICL) ≡ G
E
C¯
=
C¯ − ´
i∈S
∑a¯i
a β
aPi,a
C¯
(23)
Sub(GTF ) ≡ G
E
C¯
=
C¯ − F (GTF )
C¯
(24)
In addition, for the case of the ICL, we define an individual counterpart of equation (23)
in order to capture the distributional differences implied by the repayments structure.
The share of the total cost for the university-graduates not repaid by individual i is
defined as:.
Subi =
d−∑a¯ia βaPi,a
d
(25)
• Repayment year, as defined by equation (8).
In what follows, we present the individual measures in equations (19) to (25) aggregated by
percentiles of the lifetime income distribution, and the aggregate ones in equations (23) and
(24) as reference flat lines. We will display these outcomes in three different graphs. In all
experiments shown, we assume time discounting is equal to β = 0.978, which corresponds to
a discounting interest rate of 2.2%.8
Baseline (2007 UK Reform). We start with our baseline scenario which follows broadly
the 2007 UK reform. In particular, we set:
d = 21, 000 euros
r = 0%
p = 10% annual earnings
x = 15, 000 euros
m = 25 years
A level of debt of 21,000 euros is close to the current cost for the government of degrees
that last 3 years in Spain. We assume for now that the loan interest rate is 0% (i.e. a
8Following Dearden et al. (2008), we set β = 1/1 + dr, where dr is the discounting interest rate, set to
2.2% to approximate the interest rate the government faces when borrowing.
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returnable fellowship) and that the repayment rate is 10%. There is an exemption income
level at 15,000 euros. This means that university graduates pay 10% of their earnings once
income is above 15,000 euros. Finally, the debt write-off is such that there is a maximum
of 25 years of repayment. If after 25 years the loan has not been fully returned, then the
university graduate does not need to pay any more.
First, we display the net present value of repayments in the top graph in Figure 3 with and
without the taxes paid to finance general education. Let’s focus first on the ICL repayments.
As expected, the NPV of repayments (without taxes) is an increasing and concave function
of income, with the lowest percentile paying around 1,000 euros in total, while the median
pays around 13,000 euros and the top percentile pays near 18,000 euros. Notice that there is
a subsidy for everyone, including the lifetime-richest. This is due to an interest rate subsidy,
or the presence of time discounting when interest rates are 0. The repayment with taxes
displays a similar profile, which is shifted upwards for all income levels. Note that the shift
is a bit higher the higher the income reflecting the nature of the progessive income tax.9
This shows that the bulk of the progressivity in the ICLs comes from the repayments to the
debt rather than income taxes devoted to higher education. We next look at the profile for
GTF. The NPV of repayments without taxes are simply the university fees which are flat.
The NPV of repayments with taxes show a slight disproportionate increase for the richest,
which shows that the only source of progressivity in the GTF system is inherited from the
progressivity of the income tax. Besides being overall smaller, the rate at which it increases
with the level of income is very slow, indicating that the flatness of the fees dominates for
most of the distribution. Overall, we confirm result 3, that the bulk of the progressivity of
the ICLs comes from the repayments without taxes. In the next ICL experiments we will
therefore concentrate on the NPV if repayments without taxes.
Next, we display the public subsidy in the bottom panel in Figure 3. The solid line is
the subsidy coming from the ICLs by income levels. As expected, it is decreasing in lifetime
income, as the higher-percentile workers are able to repay a larger amount of the loan. The
two flat lines correspond to the average (or aggregate, given that the size of the population
is normalized). It is clear to see that the average subsidy after introducing the ICLs (dashed
line) is about half ot the current subsidy under GTF (dotted blue line), which, as already
pointed out, is around 80%.
Finally, we display the years to repay the loan since graduation in the middle panel in
Figure 3. This indicator is useful to understand the individual burden from a different point
of view. As expected, it is decreasing with income. Overall, the range of years we observe
9To mimic the Spanish tax code, we have proxied income taxes with a step function with 5 income
thresholds.
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for this baseline case ranges from 25 years to 15 years and only the bottom 17% is unable
to repay its debt.
In the following subsections we consider different levels of debt, exemption levels, debt
write-off years, repayment rates, as well as different loan interest rates. For each case, we
vary one parameter at a time, leaving the remaining values fixed at the baseline level.
The impact of the total amount of debt (fees)
In this subsection, we consider five different levels of debt, keeping everything else constant.
Different levels of debt can be thought of as different levels of fees and/or allowing for the
loan to cover maintenance costs. We leave the discussion of what can be done with the
additional resources for section 4.3. The different levels of debt considered are: (i) 5,000
euros, which is close to the current level of total fees for a degree; (ii) 21,000 euros, which is
our baseline and is close to the current level of total cost; and (iii) 40,000 euros, which can be
can be thought of as a loan that covers fees and maintenance. We also consider intermediate
cases of 10,000 euros and 30,000 euros, but, for ease of exposition, we highlight the former
three in Figure 4 (the others are included with a light grey color).
The main finding from this experiment is that the NPV of repayments, the repayment
years and the subsidy all follow similar patterns along the income distribution for the different
levels of debt. As expected, we find that the repayments, the number of years to repay and
the subsidy are increasing with the level of debt (given that the repayment rate is constant).
The impact of the exemption level
In this subsection, we consider four different exemption levels, keeping everything else con-
stant. The different exemption levels considered are: (i) 10,000 euros; (ii) 15,000 euros,
which is our baseline; and (iii) 25,000 euros. We also consider an intermediate case of 20,000
euros, but, for ease of exposition, we highlight the former three in Figure 5 (the other is
included with a light grey color).
Again, we find that the NPV of repayments, the repayment years and the subsidy all
follow similar patterns along the income distribution for the different exemption levels. This
can be visualized in Figure 5. As expected, the higher the exemption level, the higher
probability not to fully repay and thus the higher the subsidy.
The impact of the debt write-off year
In this subsection, we consider four different debt write-off years, keeping everything else
constant. The different write-off years considered are: (i) 15 years; (ii) 25 years, which is our
baseline; and (iii) 30 years. We also consider an intermediate case of 20 years, but, for ease
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Figure 4: Different debt levels
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Figure 5: Different exemption levels
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of exposition, we highlight the former three in Figure 6(the other is included with a light
grey color).
Once again, we find that the NPV of repayments, the repayment years and the subsidy
all follow similar patterns along the income distribution for the different debt write-off years.
This can be visualized in Figure 6. As expected, the higher the number of write-off years,
the lower is the amount of the loan that will be returned and thus the higher the subsidy
will be.
4.2.1 The impact of the repayment rate
In this subsection, we consider four different repayment rates, keeping everything else con-
stant. The different repayment rates considered are: (i) 5 percent; (ii) 10 percent, which is
our baseline; and (iii) 15 percent. We also consider an intermediate case of 8 percent, but,
for ease of exposition, we highlight the former three in Figure 7 (the other is included with
a light grey color).
Once again, we find that the NPV of repayments, the repayment years, and the subsidy
all follow similar patterns along the income distribution for the different repayment rates.
This can be visualized in Figure 7. As expected, the higher the repayment rate, the higher
is the amount of the loan that will be returned and thus the lower the subsidy will be.
4.2.2 The impact of the interest rate
Last but not least, in this subsection, we consider five different levels of the interest rate.
This is a policy variable that receives high attention. The different interest rates considered
are: (i) 0 percent, which is our baseline; (ii) 0.5 percent; and (iii) 2.2 percent. We also
consider intermediate cases of 0.8 and 1.5 percent, but, for ease of exposition, we highlight
the former three in Figure 8 (the others are included with a light grey color).
Once again, we find that the NPV of repayments, the repayment years, and the subsidy
all follow similar patterns along the income distribution for the different interest rates. This
can be visualized in Figure 8. It is worth remembering that the repayments are independent
of the interest rate, they are just a share of worker’s income. However, a higher interest
rate means that the debt generated is higher and therefore in general it takes longer to
repay the loan. So, in general, we find that the higher interest rates imply a higher NPV of
repayments, it takes more years to repay and thus that the subsidy will be lower. However,
it is worth highlighting that, as opposed to the general perception, higher interest rates does
not increase the burden of the debts for the lower part of the income distribution given the
other parameters. This is because the total debt to be repaid in these cases is bounded by
the exemption level and the debt write-off. That is, lower income individuals do not get to
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Figure 6: Different debt write-off years
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Figure 7: Different repayment rates
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pay the increased debt due to the higher interest rates because they reach the debt write-off.
Our findings are comparable to those in Dearden et al. (2008).
Figure 8: Different interest rates
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4.3 Using Resources to Increase Quality
In the theoretical framework of Section 2, we briefly discussed alternative uses for the po-
tential increase in university resources under the ICL system. Of particular interest to us
is the option to channel those resources to university quality increases. In this Section, we
evaluate the implications of such a policy for loan repayment, the public subsidy to higher
education, and the income distribution net of debt.
We assume that the increase of university resources lead to higher quality of education.
This could be interpreted as either a larger investment to the university (better faculty,
R&D, etc.) or as a way of financing geographical mobility that could lead to better student-
university matching. Ichino and Terlizzese (2013) studies this channel in the context of Italy
and highlights that ICLs, by giving the economic means directly to students allows them
to choose which university to attend, which in turn would reward the best universities and
penalize the worst ones. Coupled with the ability of universities to increase fees, as well as
to redesign their programs, this means the ICLs can improve the quality of the university
system.
We model an increase in higher education quality as a uniform and permanent increase
in the productivity of skilled workers. We denote the new earnings at age a for individual i
with Y Q, given by
Y Qia = A(Q)Yia,
where A(Q) can be understood as the private internal rate of return (IRR) for a young
person attaining tertiary education, which is basically the interest rate that an individual can
expect to receive on the investment made by spending time and money to obtain an educa-
tion. We use the data and methodology from the OECD and set A(Q)=10% (OECD, 2013).
In the remaining of this section, we incorporate this quality improvement in our baseline
specification and compare the average subsidy with the case without quality improvement.
In general, the conclusions regarding the three outcomes that we focused on the previous
section extend to this case. This is straightforward, as the earnings increase is uniform along
the income distribution. There are, however, two points worth noting.
First, given the higher earnings of the skilled workers, the repayment ability of individuals
increases, therefore decreasing the government subsidy. This decrease is disproportionally
born by the lower part of the distribution, particularly by those who were not able to repay
before. This point can be easily seen in Table 3. Second, notice that the fact that the average
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subsidy is lower as quality increases is an important result, since this means a multiplying
effect on the university surplus that can translate into further quality increases over time.
Finally, considering increases in quality would make the median voter more likely to
support a policy in the style of the one proposed in this paper.
Table 3: Average Subsidy
All Lower 10% Top 10%
No Quality Improvements 46.33% 88.71% 18.95%
Quality Improvements 41.40% 84.74% 17.75%
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Table 4 summarises the effects of the different policy experiments undertaken above. Columns
1 to 3 indicate the case being considered. Column 4 displays the average subsidy for the
total population, that was represented as a flat horizontal line in the graphs. Columns 5 to
7 display the total average repayments, as well as the total repayments for the workers in
the lower 10% of the lifetime income distribution and the total repayments for the workers
in the top 10% of the lifetime income distribution. These three columns are complementary
to the graphs and do not add new information. Columns 8 and 9, display the within-group
progressivity for both the GTF and the ICL systems, as defined in equations (14) and (16).
As expected, within-group prorgressivity for the GTF does not change with the ICL param-
eters. A special case is the case of different levels in the principal (d) as we have imposed
that the total amount given in the form of ICL adds up to the total cost of higher education.
To make things comparable, fees are adjusted accordingly. Therefore higher debt translates
into higher fees which makes the GTF less progressive as the flat component of the burden
becomes more important. Finally, column 10 offers a comparison of the ICL progressivity
with respect to the baseline case, that is, the difference between each case in column 9 with
the baseline, i.e., the first line of such column.
Table 4 highlights that there are many different ways to achieve a higher subsidy and/or
more progressivity. Within each experiment, both the average subsidy and the progressivity
measure are monotonous to changes in the parameter of interest. Furthermore, increases
in the average subsidy are associated to increases in progressivity. The largest changes
in progressivity are found in changes in the level of exemption. Overall, increases in the
repayment rate and the debt write-off year have regressive effects and the savings from
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the lower subsidy could be achieved by increasing the interest rate. Despite its unpopular
nature, the interest rate has redistributive effects at a very low cost for the taxpayers. Finally,
increasing the debt can have large effects, but they are concentrated at the top of the lifetime
income distribution.
To conclude, we want to go back to one of our lead questions: Would the introduction
of an ICL system be feasible in a dysfunctional labor market like the one in Spain? Our
concern here was that low and unstable earnings among university graduates could make the
repayments of loans insufficient. However, in this respect, we have found that for a wide set
of reasonable parameter values, it would be feasible. In particular, in all our experiments,
the subsidy paid by the government under the ICLs is lower than the current subsidy at 80%.
Therefore, the government saves in the new system. This could translate into lower taxes, or
investment in other public goods or in improvements in university quality.10 Given that the
Spanish labor market is an extreme case in terms of the high levels of unemployment and
high incidence of temporary contracts among OECD countries, this an important lesson for
countries with similar labor markets.
Looking at the other agents in the economy, universities cannot be worse off with the
implementation of ICLs, as they could have more resources. Individuals without a university
degree would be better off as they would pay lower taxes as a result of the lower subsidy.
Finally, regarding university graduates it would depend on their position in income distri-
bution. Those at the lower tail would be better off, as they could benefit from a better
university and/or lower income taxes at no education additional cost compared to the pre-
vailing system. Moving up in the income distribution means that the subsidy received is
lower and it becomes less obvious that the benefits can compensate the costs. A good point
of reference is whether the median voter would favor or not this policy. Given that the share
of non-college graduates is 64% 11 in Spain, whom we have argued unambiguously gain, and
that, from our different simulations, roughly the bottom 20% of the university graduates pay
less than in the current case, it is not unreasonable to think that the median voter would
support ICLs. We acknowledge that the final answer would ultimately depend on the human
capital and university quality increases after the introduction of ICLs.
It would appear strange that given the savings we anticipate for the median voter, there
is not a large demand for ICLs to be introduced in most developed countries. The next two
paragraphs discuss two justifications for this. One issue is that the ICL are perceived as
traditional loans. But as we have discussed, all in all, the ICLs are isomorphic to returnable
10Moen (1998) shows how ICLs can help restore optimal levels of investment in human capital in the
presence of search frictions and wage bargaining.
11OECD (2018).
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fellowships of different amounts in the sense that the sum of repayments does not exceed
the fees except for the case where interest rate is above zero. Also, Diris and Ooghe (2018)
offer a discussion from the political economy literature on this exact question. They explain
that the transition from a general-tax-financed subsidy to ICL generates winners and losers
and therefore it is not obvious to have a majority for the change; also, other key aspects for
a majority include the relative usage of higher education versus the relative tax contribution
of users and non-users, the presence of private education as well as the importance of risk
aversion on future labor market outcomes. Diris and Ooghe (2018) conclude that it is likely
that support for ICL comes from parents of talented poor and middle income families. This
highlights an interesting aspect that we would like to highlight: that ICLs break the link
between parents and children in tertiary education financing because repayments are set as
function of children’s future earnings, independently of family background. This, in turn,
implies that, unlike other social policies, ICL systems represent a transfer from the older
cohorts to the younger cohorts. Moreover, it is the richer older cohorts that would finance
university the poorer younger cohorts, thus potentially enhancing intergenerational mobility.
Another possible explanation for the lack of ICL support is ignorance by the voters. But
given that the example of countries where they exist is quite notorious, and its analysis in
Dearden et al. (2008) is about a decade old, it is surprising that no political entrepreneur
has used it to move up the political ladder. A more intriguing explanation would rely on the
fact that real politics are multidimensional, and a coalition of the winner in this issue could
have formed with those of other issues on a stable platform. Levy (2005) is an example
of how this explanation could work. She models a society in which there are two issues,
public education and redistribution. She then shows that when the cohort size of the young
is not too large, a coalition between the rich and the young segment of the poor can form
with public education used as a political compromise. Future research could explore whether
another coalition might have formed around public funding for higher education.
Finally, while in this paper we are focusing on the gains associated to more resources and
higher progressivity, there are both limitations and benefits of the ICL system that we find
worth mentioning but fall beyond the scope of this paper. On the one hand, our approach
is limited in the sense that it ignores endogenous responses to the policy changes. Two
prominent examples of these limitations are: (1) Workers close to the top of the distribution
might be deterred from working if that means paying a larger fraction of their fees back
if the substitution effect is strong enough. Given the income distribution in Spain, we
find this case to be unlikely. Looking at table 4, the top 10% of the distribution pays
almost the full amount under all scenarios. Working a few hours less would decrease income
but not the burden of paying for college. It is also important to remember that these are
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workers for whom work yields direct utility rather than a mere source of income. (2) While
the introduction of ICLs could, for given a earnings distribution, lead to lower university
enrollment because students would have a higher cost for the same education; it is also true
that the introduction of ICLs will likely change the earnings distribution and lead to an
increase in enrollment if individuals anticipate that the return of human capital will increase
with ICL. On the other hand, additional benefits of moving away from the GTF system that
have not been explicitly analyzed in this paper that we find of particular interest include:
(1) The ICL scheme also features an insurance component through the exemption level, the
debt write-off, and the repayment factor. While this is partly captured by our measures of
within-group progressivity, in the context of a highly volatile and uncertain labor market
like the one in Spain, this is likely to provide additional benefits to the workers to the extent
that lower uncertainty affects consumption and savings decisions. (2) When the main part
of university resources is publicly provided, government budget cuts have a strong impact on
the survival and quality of tertiary education institutions. This can have perverse effects such
as making university quality cyclical or exposing higher education institutions to political
uncertainty and the business cycle. We leave these questions for future research.
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Table 4: Cases Comparison
Case Value Units Avge. Subsidy (%) Repayment of ICL (
∑
P/C¯) Within-group Progressivity Comparison
(Subi) Total Top 10% Lower 10% GTF
(
τseYp90+F
τseYp10+F
)
ICL
(
τseYp90+
´
i∈p90
∑
a β
aPia
τseYp10+
´
i∈p10
∑
a β
aPia
)
ICLs with baseline
Baseline 46.33 70.30 99.84 14.78 1.77 7.05 0.00
Interest R.
r 0.5 % 44.45 73.06 104.88 14.78 1.77 7.36 0.30
r 0.8 % 43.30 74.75 108.11 14.78 1.77 7.56 0.50
r 2.2 % 37.86 82.82 125.40 14.78 1.77 8.63 1.57
Debt
d 5000 Euros 24.05 91.86 100.00 50.86 3.17 2.37 -4.69
d 10000 Euros 32.75 84.42 99.99 30.40 2.38 3.80 -3.25
d 40000 Euros 60.90 52.95 98.41 7.76 1.44 11.67 4.62
Exempt
x 10000 Euros 35.24 82.87 99.95 31.41 1.77 3.56 -3.50
x 20000 Euros 56.20 58.41 99.50 7.02 1.77 12.39 5.34
x 25000 Euros 64.44 48.09 98.54 3.46 1.77 18.01 10.95
Debt Write-Off
m 15 Years 63.71 44.17 87.35 8.92 1.77 8.80 1.75
m 20 Years 52.83 59.84 98.25 12.15 1.77 7.92 0.87
m 30 Years 41.64 78.73 99.99 18.36 1.77 6.10 -0.95
Repay.Rate
p 5 % 62.04 51.52 98.11 7.39 1.77 11.24 4.18
p 8 % 51.17 64.74 99.69 11.82 1.77 8.38 1.33
p 15 % 38.37 78.86 99.94 22.10 1.77 5.00 -2.06
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Appendix
A Comparing the Three Systems: Further Results and
Details
In this section, we provide further details on and complementary results to the calculations
shown in Section 2.4 to support our statement in Result 2.
Detailed calculations behind equations (12).
Burdenu(GTF ) = τ¯uY u (26)
Burdens(GTF ) = τ¯ sY s + F (GTF ) (27)
Burdenu(GT ) = τ¯uY u − (C¯ − F (GTF ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
PublicSavings(GT )
(28)
Burdens(GT ) = (τ¯ s + φ)Y s
= τ¯ sY s + F (GTF ) +
GE(GTF )
G¯
[τ¯ sY s + τ¯uY u]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(C¯−F (GTF ))=PublicSavings(GT )
= τ¯ sY s + C¯ (29)
Burdenu(ICL) = τ¯uY u − (
ˆ
i∈S
a¯i∑
a=1
Pia − F (GTF ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
PublicSavings(ICL)
(30)
Burdens(ICL) = τ¯ sY s +
ˆ
i∈S
a¯i∑
a=1
Pia︸ ︷︷ ︸
=PublicSavings(ICL)+F (GTF )
, (31)
Burden (cost) of financing GE. Besides the total cost in the form of out of pocket ex-
penses and total general tax financing, we look at the burden directly associated to financing
universities. Let Burdenje (j = u, s) denote the cost of financing higher education for each
type of private agent, both out of pocket and in the form of taxes that are used to subsidy
the public spending on higher education.
As a first step, we show that the public subsidy to higher education is lowest under the
GT system and, as long as there is a minimum level of ICL debt repayment, highest under
GTF. Formally, this states, that GE(GTF ) > GE(ICL) > GE(GT ) = 0, where the last
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equality follows directly GE(GT ) = C¯ −Φ = 0. To understand the last inequality, it suffices
to make the plausible assumption that there is not full repayment of the ICL. For the first
inequality, we need a minimum level of ICL repayment sufficient to cover at least for the GTF
level of fees. Formally,
´
i∈S
∑a¯i
a=1 Pia > F (GTF ). While this is a empirical question that
will be at the core of out loan laboratory, we can anticipate it is a very plausible assumption
and feasible under various ICL parameter configurations.
Next, we calculate and compare the burden of public higher education for the different
agents under the different systems.
Burdenue (GTF ) = τ
u
e (GTF )Y
u =
GE(GTF )
G¯
τ¯uY u (32)
Burdense(GTF ) = τ
s
e (GTF )Y
s + F (GTF ) (33)
Burdenue (GT ) = 0 (34)
Burdense(GT ) = φY
s = F (GTF ) + τ se (GTF )Y
s + τue (GTF )Y
u
= F (GTF ) +
GE(GTF )
G¯
[τ¯ sY s + τ¯uY u] (35)
Burdenue (ICL) = τ
u
e (ICL)Y
u =
GE(ICL)
G¯
τ¯uY u (36)
Burdense(ICL) = τ
s
e (ICL)Y
s +
ˆ
i∈S
a¯i∑
a=1
Pia
=
GE(ICL)
G¯
τ¯ sY s +
ˆ
i∈S
a¯i∑
a=1
Pia (37)
Essentially, in the GT system, the total education burden of the unskilled is absorbed
by the skilled workers. In the case of the ICL, the portion of the fees that is not repaid is
financed by both the skilled an unskilled similarly to the GTF case, with the difference that
now GE(ICL) < GE(GTF ). Therefore, the burden for the unskilled is lower.
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